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1975] CASE COMMENTS
Products Liability-BLOOD TRANSFUSIONS-"IMPLIED WARRANTY" Ac-
TION AGAINST BLOOD SUPPLIERS REQUIRES SHOWING OF DETECTABLE
DEFECT AND NEGLIGENCE.-Williamson v. Memorial Hospital, 307
So. 2d 199 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
After receiving several blood transfusions, Faye Williamson, a
patient at Memorial Hospital of Bay County, contracted serum
hepatitis. She subsequently brought suit against the hospital, alleging
inter alia that the hospital had breached implied warranties of fitness
and merchantability by furnishing her with contaminated blood. The
circuit court granted the hospital's motion to strike Ms. Williamson's
complaint, relying on section 672.316(5), Florida Statutes.1 That sec-
tion classifies blood transactions as services rather than sales, and
therefore arguably precludes the maintenance of an implied warranty
action for the sale of defective blood. The lower court certified the
question of the maintenance of such an action to the First District
Court of Appeal.2 In Williamson v. Memorial Hospital, the district
court held that an action sounding in implied warranty could be
maintained under this statute only when the plaintiff alleged and
proved that the defect that caused the injury was detectable or re-
movable by means of reasonable scientific procedures. 3
Prior to the enactment of statutes exempting blood banks and
hospitals from liability for transfusion-transmitted hepatitis,4 pro-
1. FLA. STAT. § 672.316(5) (1973) provides:
The procurement, processing, storage, distribution, or use of whole blood, plasma,
blood products, and blood derivatives for the purpose of injecting or transfusing
the same, or any of them, into the human body for any purpose whatsoever
is declared to be the rendering of a service by any person participating therein
and does not constitute a sale, whether or not any consideration is given therefor,
and the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for. a particular
purpose shall not be applicable as to a defect that cannot be detected or re-
moved by reasonable use of scientific procedures or techniques.
2. Since there was no controlling precedent under § 672.316(5), the following
question was certified: "May a plaintiff maintain an action, on the theory of implied
warranty, against the hospital and physicians, who sold and administered blood to
her, which blood the plaintiff alleges caused the plaintiff to contract, or be infected
with serum hepatitis?" Williamson v. Memorial Hosp., 307 So. 2d 199, 200 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
3. Id. at 201.
4. To date, only New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont have not
enacted statutes similar to FLA. STAT. § 672.316(5) (1973). See Heirs of Fruge v. Blood
Services, 365 F. Supp. 1344, 1350-51 n.3 (W.D. La. 1973). Not listed in Fruge are two
states, Iowa and New Hampshire, which have enacted similar statutes. See IOWA CODE
ANN. §142A.8 (Supp. 1975); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:8-b (Supp. 1973).
Only nine states of the 46 that have enacted statutes relieving hospitals and blood
banks from liability for transfusion-transmitted hepatitis have not defined the procure-
ment, processing and distribution of blood and blood products as a service. Three of
those nine states have specifically limited hospital and blood bank liability for hepatitis
FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
curement and distribution of blood and blood components5 were classi-
fied as either sales or services. In jurisdictions where procurement and
distribution were considered services, actions sounding in implied
warranty or strict liability in tort could not be maintained to recover
damages for injury resulting from post-transfusion hepatitis, since
neither warranties nor strict liability attach to such transactions. 6
related injuries to actions sounding in negligence. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 10021
(Supp. 1975); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590-3, § 2 (Supp. 1974); WYo. STAT. ANN.
§ 35-221.10 (Cum. Supp. 1973). Oklahoma has defined procurement, processing and
distribution as a "transaction" to which no implied warranties attach. OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 63, § 2151 (1973). Oregon has declared that these activities are not sales
transactions for purposes of the warranty provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code.
ORE. REV. STAT. tit. 10, § 97.300 (1974). Maryland and New Mexico, while not characteriz-
ing the procurement, processing and distribution of blood as either a sale or a service,
have provided that such transactions shall neither give rise to implied warranties nor
be subject to strict liability in tort. MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 136B (Supp. 1974); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 12-25-5 (1974). Hawaii and Virginia, without using the sales-service
characterization, have provided that no implied warranties shall arise as a result of
the procurement, processing and distribution of blood by a hospital or blood bank.
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 325-91 (Supp. 1974); VA. CODE ANN. § 32-364.2 (1973).
The remaining 36 states have enacted statutes similar to Florida's. As a whole, the
few actions which have accrued and have been litigated since the enactment of these
statutes, sounding either in implied warranty or in strict liability in tort, have met
with little success. To date, no forum, other than the district court of appeal in Wil-
liamson, 307 So. 2d at 201, has characterized one of these statutes as creating a "hybrid
implied warranty." The forums which have heard cases under these statutes have
recognized, as did the Williamson court, that implied warranty and strict liability no
longer apply in cases involving injuries resulting from post-transfusion hepatitis. In-
stead, these forums have recognized that actions against blood banks and hospitals for
such injuries must sound in negligence. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Methodist Hosp., 383 F.
Supp. 563 (W.D. Tenn. 1974); Shepard v. Alexian Bros. Hosp., Inc., 109 Cal. Rptr. 132
(Ct. App. 1973). See also McDaniel v. Baptist Memorial Hosp., 469 F.2d 230 (6th Cir.
1972).
5. Common components prepared by blood banks for transfusion include red blood
cells (also called packed cells), frozen red blood cells, leukocyte-poor blood cells (also
called buffy-poor packed cells), single donor plasma, single donor fresh frozen plasma
platelet poor whole blood, platelet rich plasma, and platelet concentrate. AMERICAN
ASSOCIATION OF BLOOD BANKS, STANDARDS FOR BLOOD BANKS AND TRANSFUSION SERVICES
19 (7th ed. 1974).
6. In a landmark decision, the New York Court of Appeals held that blood
transfusions were incidental to overall medical services utilized by a hospital in the
course of treatment. The court further stated that the patient does not contract
with the hospital for individual items used in medical care, but instead contracts for
a package of medical services including such items as bandages, medicine, blood and
professional skills. Since blood is part of hospital services no implied warranties are
attached to its distribution, and an action sounding in implied warranty cannot be
maintained. Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 123 N.E.2d 792 (N.Y. 1954). See, e.g.,
Sloneker v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 233 F. Supp. 105 (D. Colo. 1964); Dibblee v. Dr. W. H.
Groves Latter-Day Saints Hosp., 364 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1961). See also Whitehurst v. The
American Nat'l Red Cross, 402 P.2d 584 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1965) (action against a blood
bank); Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank, Inc., 132 N.W.2d 805
(Minn. 1965); Koenig v. Milwaukee Blood Center, Inc., 127 N.W.2d 50 (Wis. 1964).
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There were, however, a few jurisdictions which held that transactions
involving blood for transfusion constituted sales; 7 in at least one of
these jurisdictions this classification permitted the maintenance of an
action sounding in strict liability." Florida utilized a combination sales-
service classification system. In Florida, the activities of blood banks
in the distribution of blood were considered sales,9 while those activi-
ties when performed by hospitals were considered services. 10 Thus
before the enactment of section 672.316(5) a donee who contracted
post-transfusion hepatitis could recover against the blood bank which
provided the infected blood 1 on a theory of breach of implied war-
In McDaniel v. Baptist Memorial Hosp., 469 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1972), the court
held that a statute that characterizes the transfer of blood from a hospital or blood bank
to a patient as a service not only eliminates actions sounding in implied warranty, but
also eliminates actions sounding in strict liability in tort. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
ToRTs § 402A (1965) (emphasis added) provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
7. Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 266 N.E.2d 897 (Ill. 1970); Jackson v.
Muhlenberg Hosp., 232 A.2d 879 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1967). In Jackson the court held: "The
transfer of human blood for a consideration is a sale. So is its transfusion into the
body of a patient when a charge is made for the blood." Id. at 884.
8. Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 266 N.E.2d 897 (Ill. 1970). There
the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the reasoning in Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp.,
123 N.E.2d 792 (N.Y. 1954), see note 6 supra, and stated: "To assert that the transfusion
of whole blood by a hospital into a patient, for which a charge is made, does not give
rise to implied warranties because no 'sale' is involved is in our judgment simply un-
realistic." 266 N.E.2d at 901. See also Note, Strict Liability for Disease Contracted from
Blood Transfusion, 66 Nw. U.L. REV. 80 (1971); Note, Liability for Serum Hepatitis in
Blood Transfusions, 32 OHIo ST. L.J. 585 (1971); 69 MICH. L. REV. 1172 (1971); 25 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 349 (1971); 24 VAND. L. REv. 645 (1971); 16 VILL. L. REV. 983 (1971); 11
WM. & MARY L. REv. 1004 (1970).
9. E.g., Russell v. Community Blood Bank, Inc., 185 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1966), afJ'd as modified, 196 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1967). In Russell the district court
stated:
Regardless of the fact that a hospital supplying whole blood to a patient may be
merely performing a service incident to the over-all medical attention being
furnished, we are not willing to extend this "service" characterization to the
blood bank which originally collects and distributes the commodity.
185 So. 2d at 752.
10. See note 9 supra.
11. See Rostocki v. Southwest Florida Blood Bank, Inc., 276 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 1973)
(action commenced prior to the enactment of § 672.316(5)); Mercy Hosp., Inc. v. Benitcz,
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ranty, but could not rely on that theory in suing the hospital that ad-
ministered the blood.12
The actual concern underlying these classification schemes was
not the nature of the transaction, but rather the allocation of risk
for damages arising from transfusion-transmitted hepatitis.1 3 Florida
courts have long held retailers and manufacturers liable to purchasers
and consumers for injuries resulting from defective products. 14 Blood
257 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (hospital that provides blood from self-main-
tained blood bank assumes the same liability as the operator of an independent blood
bank); Hoder v. Sayet, 196 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Russell v. Com
munity Blood Bank, Inc., 185 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1966), ajf'd as modified,
196 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1967).
12. White v. Sarasota County Hosp. Bd., 206 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1968)
(transfer of blood by a hospital to a patient constitutes a service to which no warranties
attach).13. In Russell v. Community Blood Bank, Inc., 185 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1966), aff'd as modified, 196 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1967), the district court stated:
It is evident from our research that although many of the decisions denying
recovery for breach of implied warranty are based on the technical distinction
between a service and a sale, the factor underlying the decisions is the in-
ability, in the present state of medical knowledge, to detect or remove the virus
which causes serum hepatitis. It is often stated that it would be against public
policy to impose strict warranty liability, for an undetectable, unremovable
defect, against a non-commercial organization which was supplying a commodity
essential for medical treatment.
185 So. 2d at 752. See generally Haut & Alter, Blood Transfusions-Strict Liability?, 43
ST. JOHN's L. REv. 557, 576-77 (1969), which suggests several situations that might
develop if absolute liability were imposed upon hospitals and blood banks for trans-
fusion-transmitted hepatitis: physicians might refrain from utilizing therapy, thus in-
creasing the possibility of loss of life from shock and hemorrhage; the increased cost of
litigation would place a severe economic burden on hospitals; and imposing absolute
liability upon hospitals and blood banks would eventually result in a chronic and
dangerous shortage of blood.
Although their approaches differ somewhat, a number of other commentators have
discussed the allocation of risk in transfusion-transmitted hepatitis cases. See, e.g.,
Franklin, Tort Liability for Hepatitis: An Analysis and a Proposal, 24 STAN. L. REV.
439, 461-79 (1972); Note, Strict Liability for Disease Contracted from Blood Transfusion,
66 Nw. U.L. REV. 80, 89-94 (1971); Note, Liability for Serum Hepatitis in Blood Trans-
fusions, 32 OHIo ST. L.J. 585, 596-99 (1971); 25 U. MIAMI L. REV. 349, 353-54 (1971).
14. See, e.g., Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Todd, 101 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1958)
(manufacturer liable for injuries to consumer of soft drink); Matthews v. Lawnlite Co.,
88 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1956) (manufacturer can be liable to potential purchaser for in-
juries sustained due to a defective design in a product); Florida Coca-Cola Bottling Co.
v. Jordan, 62 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 1953) (manufacturer of soft drink liable to consumer injured
by ingested glass); Sencer v. Carl's Markets, Inc., 45 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1950) (retailer
held liable in implied warranty to injured consumer of canned sardines despite in-
ability to detect defect without destroying salability); Blanton v. Cudahy Packing Co.,
19 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 1944) (manufacturer liable for injuries to ultimate consumer of
unwholesome canned meat); Bernstein v. Lily-Tulip Cup Corp., 177 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (manufacturer of product for intimate use or human consumption
can be liable for injuries to ultimate consumer or user).
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for transfusion, however, is not, in the ordinary sense, a manufactured
or consumer product. Thus in determining whether to subject the
supplier of blood to liability for transfusion-transmitted hepatitis,
Florida's courts gave careful consideration to the nature of the product,
the necessity for its procurement and distribution, and the unfortu-
nate, but unavoidable, risk of transmitting the disease.15
Despite its willingness to hold retailers of injury-causing defective products liable
on a breach of implied warranty theory, the Florida Supreme Court has not yet adopted
strict liability in tort as expressed in either Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,
377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962) (maufacturer "strictly liable in tort" for injuries caused by
defect which renders product "unsafe for its intended use"), or RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
of TORTS § 402(A) (1965), supra note 6. See generally Ausness, From Caveat Emptor
to Strict Liability: A Review of Products Liability in Florida, 24 U. FLA. L. REV. 410 (1972);
Hicks & Sternlieb, Products Warranty Law in Florida-A Realistic Overview, 25 U.
MITAMi L. REV. 241 (1971); 41 U. DET. L.J. 459 (1964); 23 U. MIAMI L. REv. 266 (1968).
15. See Russell v. Community Blood Bank, Inc., 185 So. 2d 749, 752-53 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1966), afJ'd as modified, 196 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1967) (discussing impossibility
of detecting hepatitis virus, importance of supplying a commodity essential to health,
and other liability-related factors); Hoder v. Sayet, 196 So. 2d 205, 210 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1967) (listing diseases commonly transmitted by transfusion and noting yearly
death rate in the United States from transfusions). See also Shepard v. Alexian Bros.
Hosp., Inc., 109 Cal. Rptr. 132 (Ct. App. 1973).
In Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 123 N.E.2d 792 (N.Y. 1954), the New York
Court of Appeals stated:
Informed opinion is at hand that there is today neither a means of detecting
the presence of the jaundice-producing agent in the donor's blood nor a practical
method of treating the blood to be used for transfusion so that the danger may
be eliminated. . . . The art of healing frequently calls for a balancing of risks
and dangers to a patient. Consequently, if injury results from the course adopted,
where no negligence or fault is present, liability should not be imposed upon the
institution or agency actually seeking to save or otherwise assist the patient.
Id. at 795. Cf. cases cited notes 6, 8, 13 supra. The obvious necessity of transfusions, despite
the accompanying and unavoidable risk of hepatitis, played a substantial role in the
adoption of statutes relieving both blood banks and hospitals from warranty and tort
liability. The Florida Legislature, in enacting § 672.316(5), stated:
WHEREAS, the procurement, processing, storage, distribution, or use of
whole blood, plasma, blood products, and blood derivatives, for the purpose of
injecting or transfusing the same, or any of them, into the human body provides
the general public with a desirable and necessary medical service, and
WHEREAS, in the present state of human knowledge the rendering of this
service is attended with a known but reasonable risk, and
WHEREAS, the continuance of the operation of community and private blood
banks provides the citizens of Florida with a service which might otherwise have
to be provided by the State of Florida, ...
Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-157, Preamble. The Illinois Legislature in enacting a similar
statute, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91, § 181 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975), stated:
The availability of scientific knowledge, skills and materials for the purpose of
injecting, transfusing or transplanting human whole blood, plasma, blood products,
blood derivatives and products . . . is important to the health and welfare of the
people of this State. The imposition of legal liability without fault upon the
persons and organizations engaged in such scientific procedures inhibits the
exercise of sound medical judgment and restricts the availability of important
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The enactment of section 672.316(5) in effect ended the application
of the tenets of conventional implied warranty to the procurement
and distribution of blood in Florida. After defining blood procure-
ment, processing and distribution as a service, the statute provides
that "the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a
particular purpose shall not be applicable as to a defect that cannot
be detected or removed by reasonable use of scientific procedures or
techniques."1 6 The Williamson court construed this language to mean
that an action sounding in implied warranty could be brought despite
the classification of blood procurement, processing and distribution
as a service.1 7 The court indicated, however, that such an action is
available only if it is shown that the defect was detectable and that
there was a failure to exercise reasonable care.' This, the court opined,
amounted to the creation of a new cause of action: a "hybrid form
of implied warranty."' 9
As applied to blood transfusions, the statute establishes what may
be termed a hybrid implied warranty of fitness which departs from
the concept of strict liability or liability without fault ordinarily
ascribed to such warranty and instead establishes a criteria for
recovery which is ordinarily understood by lawyers and judges to
be cognizable in negligence.20
At present, the existence of this "hybrid" cause of action is of
little more than academic interest. Even the most advanced techniques
cannot detect the hepatitis virus in blood with any degree of cer-
tainty.21 Thus under the present state of scientific knowledge, blood
scientific knowledge, skills and materials. It is therefore the public policy of
this State to promote the health and welfare of the people by limiting the
legal liability arising out of such scientific procedures to instances of negligence
or willful misconduct.
16. FLA. STAT. § 672.316(5) (1973).
17. 307 So. 2d at 201.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. The Williamson court seems to have been bothered by the somewhat con-
fusing language of § 672.316(5). There was, however, no attempt to second-guess the
legislature. The court simply noted, "[B]y invoking what courts refer to as its infinite
legislative wisdom, [the legislature] has made a legal concept ordinarily cognizable in
the law of sales now applicable to the law of negligence." Id. Thirty-six states have defined
blood procurement, processing and distribution as a service. But only Idaho, Missouri,
and Nevada have adopted statutory language akin to that of § 672.316(5). See
IDAHO CODE § 39-3702 (Supp. 1974); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 431.069 (Supp. 1975); NEv. REv.
STAT. § 460.010 (1973). To date there have been no reported decisions construing these
statutes; the Williamson court is apparently the first court in any jurisdiction to have
embraced the concept of a "hybrid" implied warranty.
21. See Franklin, Tort Liability for Hepatitis: An Analysis and a Proposal, 24
STAN. L. REv. 439, 440-45 (1972).
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banks and hospitals have been effectively exempted from warranty
liability where post-transfusion hepatitis is concerned.
The Williamson decision apparently leaves only one avenue of
recovery open to blood transfusion recipients who contract serum
hepatitis-negligence. 22 Although the Florida Supreme Court has not
dealt with the issue, one district court of appeal has implied that a
blood bank could be held liable in a hepatitis case for negligently
failing to question prospective donors concerning their general health
and medical history.2 3 Negligence actions might also be brought for
It is presently impossible to detect the hepatitis virus in blood. What can some-
times be detected is an antigen associated with the presence of the virus. The most
modern laboratory procedure utilized today in the detection of the Hepatitis B Antigen
is the radioimmunoassay (RIA). This complicated procedure, which involves radioactive
labels and counting devices, detects only 50-60% of all hepatitis positive bloods
screened. By comparison, counterelectrophoresis (CEP), also a means of detecting
hepatitis, detects only 25-30% of all hepatitis positive bloods screened. Interview
with Dale Malloy, Director of the Leon County Blood Bank, in Tallahassee, Fla., Apr.
10, 1975. See letter from D. J. Gocke, M.D., and Z. F. Kachani, M.D., to the editor of
the Journal of the American Medical Association, undated, in 224 J.A.M.A. 1425 (1973);
Abbott Laboratories Diagnostics Division, Hepatitis Associated Antibody (Anti-Australia
Antigen) 1251 (Human) Ausria® 11-125, at 13, 14 (rev. Oct. 1974).
RIA is a procedure that involves expensive equipment. Consequently, this highly
desirable technique is economically out of reach for most small hospitals and blood
banks. Units of blood screened at the Leon County Blood Bank, Leon County, Florida,
are screened both by RIA and CEP. The cost per unit for CEP is $1.03; for RIA, $3.10.
The figure for RIA does not include capital outlay for equipment owned and operated
by Tallahassee Memorial Hospital. Interview with Dale Malloy, supra.
22. See 307 So. 2d at 201. Actions for negligence may also be brought for a number
of other transfusion-related injuries, including mislabeling the patient's specimen, failure
to crossmatch the patient's specimen with compatible blood, and failure to transfuse
properly. See, e.g., Sherman v. Hartman, 290 P.2d 894 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955) (hospital
may be held liable for negligent infusion of blood into patient); Ward v. Orange
Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 193 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (hospital held liable
for negligent crossmatch of patient's specimen resulting in death); Parker v. Port Huron
Hosp., 105 N.W.2d I (Mich. 1960) (hospital held liable for negligence of technologist
who mislabeled patient's specimen, causing failure to crossmatch proper blood group);
Mississippi Baptist Hosp. v. Holmes, 55 So. 2d 142 (Miss. 1951) (hospital held liable
for negligence of technologist who correctly crossmatched but incorrectly labeled blood).
Cf. Goelz v. J. K. & Susie L. Wadley Research Inst. & Blood Bank, 350 S.W.2d 573 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1961); Brown v. Shannon Memorial Hosp., 222 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. Civ. App.
1949); Gile v. Kennewick Pub. Hosp. Dist., 296 P.2d 662 (Wash. 1956). For general
discussions of negligence in the blood transfusion context, see Dunn, Blood Transfusions
and Serum Hepatitis, 15 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 497 (1966); Franklin, Tort Liability for
Hepatitis: An Analysis and a Proposal, 24 STAN. L. REv. 439, 446-56 (1972).
23. Hoder v. Sayet, 196 So. 2d 205, 209-10 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967). See also
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF BLOOD BANKS, STANDARDS FOR BLOOD BANKS AND TRANSFUSION
SERvIcEs 3 (7th ed. 1974). Criteria for donor selection include the rejection of donors
who either have a history of hepatitis or have been in contact with the disease within
the past six months. Any unit of blood with a positive screening test for hepatitis is
traced to the donor, who is then excluded from future donations.
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failure to utilize sterile techniques and equipment, 4 and possibly for
failure to comply with at least the minimum accepted local laboratory
procedures for detection of viral hepatitis.2 5
Absent negligence, a transfusion recipient who subsequently con-
tracts hepatitis is effectively barred from recovery by section 672.316(5).
Although probably not vulnerable to due process or equal protection
attacks, 26 the statute may contravene the provisions of article 1, sec-
tion 21 of the Florida Constitution, which provides: "The courts
shall be open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice
shall be administered without sale, demand or delay." In Kluger v.
White, 17 the Florida Supreme Court discussed whether this provision
24. Hepatitis can also be transmitted by the use of contaminated equipment.
Therefore, it is imperative that all needles, blood containers, lancets, syringes and
other equipment capable of infecting either donor or unit be sterile. If the transmission
of hepatitis can be traced to a failure to utilize sterile technique and equipment, there
should be ample ground for an action sounding in negligence. No cases alleging this
type of negligence have been found, however.
25. See note 21 supra. The relatively inexpensive CEP test is available to virtually
every hospital and blood bank, regardless of size. Failure to utilize this very basic test
should amount to failure to exercise due care.
26. Ms. Williamson contended that § 672.316(5) was unreasonable and capricious
class legislation that denied her equal protection under the law. Brief of Petitioner at
5, Williamson v. Memorial Hosp., 307 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975). The
First District Court of Appeal, in its answer to the certified question, did not address
itself to this issue.
It is doubtful that § 672.316(5) offends the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. In Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974), the Florida
Supreme Court pointed out: "In order to comply with the requirements of the Equal
Protection clause, statutory classifications must be reasonable and non-arbitrary, and
all persons in the same class must be treated alike." Id. at 18. The classification in-
volved in § 672.316(5) does not appear to be unreasonable or arbitrary. By declaring
that any transaction involving blood for transfusion is to be considered "the rendering
of a service by any person participating therein," FLA. STAT. § 672.316(5) (1973) (emphasis
added), the legislature clearly intended to exempt all suppliers of blood from warranty
liability. Thus all blood recipients are equally affected. The statute therefore seems
to comport with the requirements outlined in Lasky.
Similar statutes in other jurisdictions have been upheld against both due process
and equal protection attacks. In upholding the constitutionality of such a statute in
Tennessee, the federal district court in McDaniel v. Baptist Memorial Hosp., 352 F.
Supp. 690 (W.D. Tenn. 1971), af'd, 469 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1972), pointed out that:
The fact that the important service of blood transfusions has been singled out
for legislative treatment, and immunity to some degree is bestowed, does not, in
and of itself, make it unlawful or unconstitutional. . . . The question is whether
the classification is so arbitrary and capricious as to constitute denial of equal
protection. ...
The law in question involves all within the class of selling or distributing
blood or plasma equally and treats this activity as a medical service.
352 F. Supp. at 695. In affirming McDaniel, the Sixth Circuit cited these statements with
approval, 469 F.2d at 235, as did the court in Heirs of Fruge v. Blood Services, 365
F. Supp. 1344 (W.D. La. 1973).
27. 281 So. 2d I (Fla. 1973). See 2 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 178 (1974).
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"bars the statutory abolition of an existing remedy without providing
an alternative protection to the injured party."2 The court concluded
that article 1, section 21 bars the enactment of a statute that abolishes
a common law right of redress unless the legislature provides a reason-
able alternative procedure for redress or can justify its action on the
basis of some "overpowering public necessity," and no alternative
method of meeting that necessity can be shown.2 9
By exempting blood banks and hospitals from conventional implied
warranty liability for transfusion-transmitted hepatitis, section 672.-
316(5) has, in essence, abolished an injured donee's common law right
of redress.2 0 It is questionable whether an action for such injuries
sounding in negligence represents a reasonable alternative to an ac-
28. 281 So. 2d at 3.
29. Id. at 4.
30. Although the concept of implied warranty of title has been recognized in Florida
since the middle of the last century, see Lines v. Smith, 4 Fla. 47 (1851) (implied warranty
of title in sale of slave), the first reference to an implied warranty of merchantability
appeared in Demens v. LeMoyne, 8 So. 442 (Fla. 1890). In 1918, the Florida Supreme
Court, in Berger v. E. Berger & Co., 80 So. 296 (Fla. 1918), held that an implied war-
ranty of fitness applied to a sale of lumber.
We think the rule is well established . . . that where a person contracts to supply
an article in which he deals for a particular purpose, knowing the purpose
for which he supplies it and that the purchaser has no opportunity to inspect
the article, but relies upon the judgment of the seller, there is an implied
condition or "warranty" as it is called, that the article is fit for the purpose
to which it is to be applied.
id. at 299. See note 14 supra; Parkinson & Sanders, Implied Warranty in Florida, 12
U. FLA. L. REv. 241, 248 (1959).
Despite the fact that implied warranty is well-established in Florida's common law,
the precise language used by the Kluger court may create problems for anyone attacking
§ 672.316(5)'s constitutionality. In Kluger, the Florida Supreme Court stated that the
legislature could not, without providing a reasonable alternative or showing an over-
powering public necessity, abolish a right of redress "where such right has become a
part of the common law of the State pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 2.01, F.S.A." 281 So. 2d
at 4. FLA. STAT. § 2.01 (1973) provides:
The common and statute laws of England which are of a general and not a local
nature, with the exception hereinafter mentioned, down to the fourth day of
July, 1776, are declared to be of force in this state; provided, the said statutes
and common law be not inconsistent with the constitution and laws of the United
States and the acts of the legislature of this state.
Implied warranties of fitness or merchantability were apparently unknown in English
common law in 1776. The first judicial recognition in England of implied warranties
of quality did not appear until the early part of the nineteenth century. Gardiner v.
Gray, 171 Eng. Rep. 46 (K.B. 1815); Laing v. Fidgeon, 128 Eng. Rep. 974 (C.P. 1815).
See Ausness, From Caveat Emptor to Strict Liability: A Review of Products Liability
in Florida, 24 U. FLA. L. REv. 410 (1972). See generally 2 A. SQUILLANTE & J. FONSECA,
WILLISTON ON SALS § 15 (4th ed. 1974). The precise holding in Kluger may thus
preclude claims that § 672.316(5) is violative of FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 21. But cf. Coleman
v. Davis, 120 So. 2d 56 (lst Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
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tion sounding in implied warranty.3 ' Absent a reasonable alternative,
there must exist some overpowering public necessity for section
672.316(5). This requirement dictates close judicial examination, and
perhaps a reevaluation, of the reasons for the enactment of this
statute.
3 2
Hopefully a reliable and effective method for detecting serum
hepatitis will one day be developed and this legislation will become
obsolete. 33 At present, the legislature has refused to subject producers
of blood products to liability without fault. This exemption from
liability represents a balancing of the desirability of private procure-
ment and distribution of an essential commodity against the risk to
the individual of contracting post-transfusion hepatitis. The William-
son decision makes it clear that, in the absence of negligence, the in-
dividual in need of blood must bear the loss resulting from hepatitis
in return for the protection of an enterprise deemed essential to the
public welfare.
LINDA JONES WELLS
31. There are two important phases of blood bank operation where negligence
may result in transfusion-transmitted hepatitis. These two phases are hepatitis testing
of donor specimens, and donor screening and selection. Determining whether trans-
fusion-transmitted hepatitis resulted from negligence in performing hepatitis detection
tests or from the inability of the test itself to detect hepatitis is virtually impossible.
Therefore, this phase is not susceptible to attack on grounds of negligence. See note 21
supra. Proving negligence in the area of donor selection is also difficult. It would ap-
pear that failure to question a prospective donor concerning his medical history and
the probability of contact with hepatitis would amount to negligence. However, the
causal relationship between such questioning and transfusion-transmitted hepatitis
is tenuous. There is no means of determining whether the donor has truthfully answered
questions even if asked. Thus it can be argued that failure to ask is no more related
to transfusion-transmitted hepatitis than asking and receiving an untruthful answer.
See Franklin, Tort Liability for Hepatitis: An Analysis and a Proposal, 24 STAN. L. REV.
439, 446-50 (1972).
32. See cases cited notes 6, 8, 13; notes 15, 21 supra. The only available statement
of matters considered by the legislature in enacting § 672.316(5) is contained in the
minutes of the House Committee on Public Health and Welfare: "What blood banks
want is relief from liability for hepatitis because of the fact that their insurance rates
are going up rapidly." File on 1968 House Public Health and Welfare (Legislative Li-
brary, Holland Building, Tallahassee, Florida).
33. See Georgia Southern & Florida Ry. v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 175 So. 2d 39, 40
(Fla. 1965) ("a statute which is valid when enacted may become invalid by changes
in . . . conditions"); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Ivey, 5 So. 2d 244 (Fla, 1941).
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